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"WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
SERVICE TO ANYONE."
JENNIFER S. HENDRICKS*
The theme of this collection of essays is "Teaching for Social Change
When You're Not Preaching to the Choir."' Not preaching to the choir can
mean either that your students are not part of the choir or you are not preaching.
My comments are about the decision whether to preach, once you have realized
that you are not facing the choir.
In my Constitutional Law class at the University of Tennessee College of
Law, there are at least two ways in which my students are not part of my choir.
First, my Tennessee students are, on average, more politically conservative than
I am and more conservative than the choir that the Society of American Law
Teachers (SALT) represents.2 They do not subscribe to my particular
constitutional hymnbook, especially regarding issues such as gender, sexual
orientation, and the separation of church and state.
Second, many of my students do not think that a course on constitutional
law is worth their time and question whether it should be required. This
surprised me. While there are many criticisms one could levy against the
traditional constitutional law curriculum3 and its role in law school, I did not
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. This essay is for
my mother Susan 0. Hendricks. See infra note 19.
1. This collection is based on the remarks of the authors at the 2008 teaching conference
of the Society of American Law Teachers.
2. Tennessee has "evolved from being a bluish state to a reddish one." Michael Nelson,
Tennessee: Once a Bluish State, Now a Reddish One, in NEW POLITICS OF THE OLD SouTH 187,
188 (Charles S. Bullock III & Mark J. Rozell eds., 3d ed. 2007). The eastern part of the state,
where the University is located, is more conservative than other regions. Id. at 209. The Society
of American Law Teachers (SALT) "is committed to creating and maintaining a community of
progressive... law professors dedicated to making a difference through the power of law."
Front Page, Society of American Law Teachers, http://www.saltlaw.org (last visited January 11,
2009).
3. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern
Europeans) and Why You Shouldn't Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 553 passim (2003)
(arguing that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), is in fact far less significant
than other cases, that it incorrectly emphasizes judicial supremacy over constitutional
supremacy, and that its reasoning "is so shoddy" that it should be used only to illustrate how not
to engage in legal analysis); Thomas E. Baker & James E. Viator, Not Another Constitutional
Law Course: A Proposal to Teach a Course on the Constitution, 76 IOWA L. REv. 739 passim
(1991);; see also Sanford Levinson, Why I Still Won't Teach Marbury (Except in a Seminar), 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 588, 603 (2004) (arguing that beginning a course in constitutional law with
Marbury "is to feed the monster that . . . courts" are the exclusive interpreters of our
Constitution); Eric J. Segall, Why I Still Teach Marbury (And So Should You): A Response to
Professor Levinson, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 573 (2004) (stating that Marbury "is a classic
that should be treated by courts and academics as an important building block for modern
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expect students to start the class uninterested in the material. As it turns out,
many of my students, as well as some of my colleagues, do not belong to the
choir that sees constitutional law, at least in some form, as an important part of
a lawyer's professional life.
For many obvious reasons, I do not preach to my students that they should
share my political views, although there is a lot of gray area in discussions of
what constitutes a good constitutional argument. On the question of the
importance of the topic, however, I have decided to preach. Although I hope
the class will prove interesting in its own right, I proselytize directly about the
importance of the constitutional law material to their roles and obligations as
lawyers and citizens.
When I took a job in Tennessee, I knew, or at least assumed, that it would
be a more conservative environment than other places I had lived. Still, I was
surprised by the size of the gulf between some of my students and me. Hot
button issues like same-sex marriage and religion in the public sphere are often
framed politically as questions of judicial deference to the legislature, and I
expected opposition to much of the Supreme Court's work in those areas. At
least some of my students have taken a further step: while Roe v. Wade4 was
wrong, for example, Lochner v. New York5 was right, and the Court should
prevent the legislature from such illegitimate interference with the free market.
I did not expect to find my students pre-disposed against the New Deal.
My own experience in law school was that political differences between the
class and the professor could produce an ideal experience. When the majority
of the class shares the professor's views, spirited defense of opposing views
comes only from a few dissenting students or from the professor's or a
student's hypothetical development of counter-arguments. A critical mass of
conservative students provides a more robust counterpoint to the professor's
own views, sparking real argument from which everyone learns. Occasionally,
that happens, and much of what I have learned from teaching this class is from
conservative students whose arguments are very different from the ones I would
have spun if I had been role-playing "the conservative view."
constitutional law").
I teach a fairly traditional basic course in constitutional law, with slightly non-
traditional emphases. It is a four-credit required course in the second year of law school. I use
the Farber, Eskridge, & Frickey casebook, and I follow its order of presentation: equal
protection, unenumerated rights, and the First Amendment, followed by federalism and
separation of powers. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CoNsTruIoNAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE
CONSTITUTION's THIRD CENTURY (3d ed. 2003). Compared to the average course, I spend more
time on equal protection, partly because I think it is important and partly because it is combined
with the overall introduction to constitutional law as a genre.
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the constitutional right to
privacy includes the right to abortion).
5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,64 (1905) (striking down a maximum-hours law
as violation of freedom of contract).
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But that does not happen very often. I was warned about this phenomenon.
My students are mostly southern, and they are not yet lawyers. They are polite.
They are deferential to me (after the first year, I stopped looking behind me
when addressed as "ma'am."). They do not wish to offend each other. They are
here to learn the law, not to argue about their views on the topics addressed in
my class: abortion, the status of women, states' rights, sodomy, same-sex
marriage, etc. Even the students who speak up with a conservative argument do
not really want to argue with me-they only go one round. If I give a counter-
argument to their position, they take it as a correction, perhaps as confirmation
that the law (as taught in my class) is against them. Many of these students
come to the course skeptical of a Supreme Court that rejects their values, and
they are easily alienated by my politics.
Different pitfalls await the students who are in the liberal/progressive choir.
These students sometimes feel isolated at UT and seek out like-minded
professors. Now in my third year of teaching, I think I have begun to see a trend
toward disproportionate enrollment in my class by liberal and progressive
students.6 These students, however, no less than their conservative counterparts,
are prone to miss the law for the politics. Rather than being alienated, they are
at risk of being lulled into intellectual laziness and of treating the class as an
affirmation of their views.
In my first year of teaching, students in both groups neglected law for
politics on an exam question that presented an issue of possible discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. I received an alarming number of exam
essays stating that sexual orientation was obviously a suspect classification.
These exams concluded, with no further analysis, that a law that may have been
motivated in part by the desire of some legislators to prevent lesbian women
from adopting children was obviously unconstitutional. Obviously?7 From this
I concluded that my students had accurately assessed my own views.]
Unfortunately, they had either confused my views with the current state of the
law or concluded that the way to do well in the class was to reflect my views on
the exam. My students had found the perfect constitution, but I was not sure
whether it was mine or theirs.9
6. I do not think it is wrong for a student to choose my course in part because he or she
shares my politics. My views about what is important obviously affect the syllabus, and students
interested in, for example, same-sex marriage will learn more about it in my section of
Constitutional Law than in the others available to them.
7. Aside from any debate about whether sexual orientation is or should be a suspect
classification, the question did not involve a facial classification, only the subjective motives of
some of the legislators who had voted for the law.
8. Not that I tried to hide them. Even if I could conceal my views, I think doing so is
unfair to students, who are entitled to know the perspective from which I teach.
9. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 353-54,
360 (1981) (criticizing constitutional scholarship that "finds" the scholars' policy preferences
enshrined in the Constitution). But see JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 15-16 (2003) (rejecting Monaghan's critique).
2009] 419
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Now, rather than try to hide my opinions, I try to confront our differences
directly. The story of those facile exams is now part of my standard lecture on
exam preparation. The moral of the story is that there is nothing more annoying
than a bad argument for the conclusion I desire. Either I will be annoyed by the
presentation of a bad argument in lieu of available good ones, or, if good ones
are not available under current law, I will imagine the client who relies on the
false hope of the bad argument. Either way, few exam points will be
forthcoming.
My strategy, then, for addressing our political differences and my students'
excessive deference is to focus the class on understanding the arguments and
what the Supreme Court is doing rather than on debating the conclusions
among ourselves. One way to chart a path through the gray area between my
political opinions and my assessment of what is a good constitutional argument
is to focus on what the Justices think is a good argument and why. The Court
actually serves as a convenient anchor, since politically it lies about halfway
between my typical student and me. This means I have to be careful not to turn
the class into a justification of everything the Court has done-defending it
against right and left rather than critiquing it-but it gives us a useful starting
point.
What, then, does it mean to teach for social change when most of your
students want change in the opposite direction? That question has sometimes
made me question my decision to teach at all. I worry that if I succeed in
teaching my students to be good lawyers, they will use those skills for what I
see as ill rather than good. The answer, I think, is a mixture of humility and
faith. The humility, of course, is in recognizing that my own views may prove
misguided or poorly reasoned. The faith is in the skills I want them to learn. My
co-panelists talked about urging students to consider questions of social change,
offering as incentive that it will make them better lawyers to do so.'0 My
strategy for the moment is the reverse: the hope that I am helping them to be
good lawyers-by analyzing and understanding the arguments rather than
rationalizing conclusions-and that doing so will open them up to
understanding opposing views. Some day they-and I-might change our
minds.
Of course, that hope-that being a good lawyer helps a person develop a
vision of and desire for justice-depends on a particular concept of what it
means to be a good lawyer. For me, that concept necessarily includes at least
some study and understanding of the Constitution. I was surprised to learn how
many of my students disagreed.
Constitutional Law was a required course when I went to law school and is
a required course where I teach. At first I considered this requirement a
formality. Who would choose to spend three years in law school but not be
interested in this course, regardless of whether they thought it would be
10. My co-panelists were Professor Susan Becker of the Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law, Cleveland State University, and Professor Sudha Setty of the Western New England
School of Law.
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practical? To this day, I gladly would have paid my three years' tuition for that
one class. Admittedly, my professor was a better teacher than I am, perhaps
than I ever will be, but the material mattered too.
Walking in with my head in these particular clouds, the biggest surprise of
my first year of teaching was the number of students who did not want to be in
the class. What, they asked skeptically, did this class have to do with them, and
how would it help them in their planned careers as patent lawyers or big-firm
associates?
My first response was defensive. I borrowed from a colleague's syllabus to
inform students that they would be surprised how much constitutional law they
would encounter in a typical practice. Patent law is federal law because of the
Constitution!" Everything is speech, so the First Amendment is everywhere! 1
2
Rational basis review has teeth at the state level! 3
The problem is, I do not cover any of that stuff. We do not have time to
figure out complicated telecommunications regulations and then apply the First
Amendment. Even if I did have that kind of time, I would not fill it with the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 199214 but with
one of a half-dozen absolutely crucial topics I have already had to cut from my
syllabus.15 As with almost every other topic, the week I used to spend on
freedom of speech (I cut it this year) was an introduction to basic concepts and
not enough to give them competence in any particular subject area.
After an argument with a colleague about the purpose of law school, I
decided to change my approach. Now, I preach. That is, I tell my students that
conveying specific information that will be useful in their first five years of
practice is not the point of my class. Instead, I preach directly about their larger
obligations as citizens and members of the bar.
Having decided to preach, I have begun to develop sermons. One of my
sermons is titled, "You Have No Idea How Powerful You Will Be." When my
students talk about themselves as lawyers, they envision themselves in their
first few years of practice. Some of my colleagues share this view and see our
mission as preparing the students for this phase of their practice: our goal is to
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
12. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1976) (holding that campaign
contributions are speech).
13. See, e.g., Ann L. lijima, Minnesota Equal Protection in the Third Millennium: "Old
Formulations" or "New Articulations"?, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 337, 348-53 (1994)
(describing emergence of heightened rational basis standard in cases involving ordinary
legislative classifications, such as sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine).
14. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-
385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
15. For the sake of time, I have cut the Free Exercise Clause; all but a quick glance at the
rest of the First Amendment; the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine; the commandeering
doctrine of Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); the Commerce Clause between
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), and UnitedStates v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); and all
other enumerated powers, including my favorite, the power to enforce the Civil War
Amendments.
2009]
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produce useful junior associates. My sermon is about what comes after that,
particularly for the many students who will become legislators, judges, and
other public officials in Tennessee and elsewhere. It begins:
You have no idea how powerful you will be in this society just because you
are a member of the bar. Judges will listen attentively to you and take you
seriously, no matter how ridiculous the words coming out ofyour mouth may
be. Trust me, I have seen this happen.
What I want the students to see is the connection between the "big ideas"
and each of their lives. So, the follow up to "You Have No Idea How Powerful
You Will Be" is a looser collection of stories on the general theme, "... And So
It Matters That You Understand this Stuff":
In the hustle and bustle of your everyday life, during a zoning review or a
committee hearing or your twelfth bail hearing of the day, every once in a
while, suddenly it is going to matter whether you understand, at the core of
your being, what it means to be part of a liberal democracy that respects
individual rights.
What I want them to learn as lawyers is that law is path-dependent-that
history matters-and that the struggles of the past are still going on today. In
particular, teaching constitutional law in a southern state, I want to convey to
my students the central role of racial struggle and subordination in our legal
history and our legal present. Constitutional law sometimes reads like a tale of
continuous progress, and once the Supreme Court resolves a question it is
resolved. Our case book does a great job showing the complexity of
constitutional law through an in-depth case study of school desegregation. Yet,
somehow, this does not make much of an impression. For most of my students,
school desegregation is ancient history. They are more impressed when we
cover Loving v. Virginia'6 and I tell them that the last state to take its interracial
marriage ban off the books was Alabama, where voters in the 2000 election
repealed the constitutional ban-by a 60-40 margin.
17
But smaller things are important too, and one of them is the title of this
essay. My class's coverage of the state action doctrine and The Civil Rights18
Cases includes a discussion of the claim that states have an obligation to
redress private discrimination. One of my short sermons is about signs that say,
"We Reserve the Right to Refuse Service to Anyone." These signs persist in
retail stores across the country. While perhaps not one of the nation's pressing
16. 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (holding that a ban on inter-racial marriage violated Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of Fourteenth Amendment).
17. Jeff Amy & Karen Tolkkinen, Amendment Two Vote Shows State Divide; Mixed
Reaction to Marriage Vote, MOBILE REGISTER, Nov. 9, 2000, at I (reporting that 59.5 percent of
voters voted for the repeal but that it failed in twenty-five majority-white counties, "sometimes
by crushing margins," and that even some majority-black counties did not support it strongly).
18. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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crises, the signs are symptoms of ahistoricism and ignorance of context. They
have a racist history of which the businesses that post them are usually
ignorant.19
Understanding their offensiveness requires wrapping one's mind around a
view of the world very different from the "it's-my-business-I-can-do-what-I-
want" attitude of today. At common law, many places of public accommodation
had a general duty of non-discrimination, an obligation to serve all comers.
20
After the Civil War, some southern states repealed that general duty so that
businesses could discriminate on the basis of race.2 Posting the sign
"reserving" the right to refuse service was an announcement that the business
was taking advantage of that opportunity. Many businesses today post these
signs just because they have heard of or seen them and foolishly think they are
necessary in order to, say, expel a drunken and disruptive customer. One of my
small goals in teaching constitutional law is to produce lawyers who will advise
their small-business clients not to post those awful signs. I preach this, even if it
means I will not have time to cover other law my students--especially those not
in my choir-think will be useful.
19. This lesson is an important one to me because it was instilled in me by my mother,
who grew up in New Orleans in the 1950s and 1960s and lectured me about it every time we
saw one of those signs. A few years ago she finally sat me down to watch GIANT (Warner Bros.
Pictures, 1956), in which such a sign plays a role in the climactic scene. See also Joe Cutbirth,
McCain 's Racist Surge, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 15, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
joe-cutbirth/mccains-racist-surge_b_ 34868.html ("' We Reserve the Right to Refuse Service to
Anyone" was catchy little code that actually meant "We don't have to wash black men's shirts at
this laundry,"' and .'[We don't have to let black families eat at our tables, stay in our hotels or
sit in our theaters, if we don't want to."').
20. See Note, The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, 102 HARV. L. REv.
1993, 1995 (1989).
21. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrTUTIoNAL LAW 1695 n.16 (2d ed. 1988).
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